Michigan Law Review
Volume 54

Issue 8

1956

Civil Procedure - Interpleader - Right to Jury Trial
John A. Beach
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
John A. Beach, Civil Procedure - Interpleader - Right to Jury Trial, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1171 (1956).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss8/6

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1956]

RECENT DECISIONS

1171

RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-INTERPLEADER-R.!GHT TO JURY TRIAL-Decedent
brought suit against applicant for personal injuries sustained in a collision
but died before judgment. His administrator continued the suit under a
statute which allowed survival of the action only if the injuries did not
cause death.1 His widow filed an action under the wrongful death statute,2
alleging that the injuries from the collision caused death. Applicant sought
to have the administrator and the widow interpleaded to adjudicate between
themselves the cause of death. On appeal from a judgment dismissing
applicant's bill, held, reversed. The interpleader statute3 authorizes such
interpleading to prevent applicant's exposure to double recovery for a single
liability. The proceeding being "equitable" in nature, there is no right
to a jury determination of the cause of death.4 Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, (Mo. 1955) 280 S.W. (2d) 17.
It is certainly both permissible and desirable to allow interpleader on
the facts of the principal case so as to avoid the possibility of two separate
juries holding the applicant liable in both actions upon inconsistent findings as to the same fact. 5 Although the court recognized that the statute
has materially modified former equitable interpleader so as to permit the ·
applicant's bill,6 it went on to label the entire proceeding as essentially
"equitable" in nature. Under the typical state constitutional guarantee
that "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate," 7
the effect of this labeling is to deny a right to determination of fact issues
by a jury where such a right would have existed if the claimants' original
actions had remained separate.8 This is improper. Under code pleading,

Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §537.020.
Id., §§537.070 to 537.090.
3 Id., §507.060 [substantially identical to rule 22 (I) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1952)].
4 Three judges dissenti:d on the issue of the right to a jury trial.
5 Separate juries might arrive at different results as to the cause of death in the re•
spective actions by the two claimants. The court in the principal case pointed out that
neither proceeding would be res judicata as to the other despite the identical issue in common, since the widow and the administrator were different parties, and nothing appeared to
show that the widow was beneficially interested in the administrator's action.
6 Under equity practice unmodified by statute, strict interpleader was precluded if
the applicant was interested in the fund, debt, or duty which was the subject matter of the
action. Pope v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., (Mo. 1915) 175 S.W. 955. A bill in the nature of
interpleader could be brought by an interested applicant, but only if he could demonstrate
grounds for equitable jurisdiction independent of the double vexation. Dom v. Fox, 61
N.Y. 264 (1874). See the classic statement of the prerequisites to interpleader in POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed., §1322 (1919), and the discussion of them by Chafee, "Modernizing Interpleader," 30 YALE L. J. 814 (1921). Cf. Chafee, "Federal Interpleader Since
the Act of 1936," 49 YALE L. J. 377 (1940), also discussing federal rule 22 (see note 3 supra).
7 Mo. CoNsr., art. 3, §22 (a).
s Seemingly an action for a declaratory judgment as to the cause of death would also
have been available for relief from exposure to double liability. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949)
1
2
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the civil form of action is neither equitable nor legal. 9 Yet the former distinctions remain important for settling constitutional jury rights. No
problems in determining the right to a jury arise when the modern "civil
action" presents issues which would have been clearly within the exclusive
jurisdiction of either the law judge or the chancellor under former practice.
But the proceeding involved in the principal case embraced both a request
for interpleading, which would have been within the chancellor's jurisdiction, and also the issue of the cause of death, which would have been within the jurisdiction of the law judge and jury. Judicial determination of
the latter issue cannot be deemed an instance of the chancellor's power to
render complete relief once jurisdiction has been obtained, since equity
would not have taken jurisdiction at all in this case.10 The expanded
statutory interpleader is neither "legal" nor "equitable," but sui generis.11
The problem of jury rights cannot be solved satisfactorily by picking a
label for the entire action when "legal" and "equitable" issues are joined
under modern combined procedure. Rather, an attempt should be made
to preserve jury determination of issues which call for legal relief and
which typically would have been tried by a jury.12 An evaluation of evi-

§§527.010 to 527.140 (substantially the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act). See :BORDECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 363-365, 396, 397 (1941), on the relation of interpleader to declaratory judgments and declarations of facts. Such a proceeding would not
have precluded the claimants' right to a jury trial. State ex rel. United States Fire Ins. Co.
v. Terte, 351 Mo. 1089, 176 S.W. (2d) 25 (1943); Crollard v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 240
Mo. App. 355, 200 S.W. (2d) 375 (1947). In 13 A.L.R. (2d) 777 at 782 (1950), the general
rule is stated "that if defendant would have a right to a jury trial if the action was
brought by him he would also have it in a declaratory judgment action by the plaintiff."
CHARD,

9 "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " Mo. Rev. Stat.
(1949) §506.040:
10 "No case is cited authorizing a tort-feasor to require persons, each claiming the sole
right to damages for the same tort [to be interpleaded . . . ]. The remarkable situation
which would result would be far more productive of injustice than it will be to require
defendant to take his chances on two juries coming to the same conclusion on the facts.''
Pope v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., note 6 supra, at 957.
11 In Crollard v. Northern Life Ins. Co., note 8 supra, at 367, involving the right to
jury trial in declaratory judgment actions, the Kansas City Court of Appeals stated: "A
proceeding for a declaratory judgment under our statute is sui generis and is not of itself
strictly either legal or equitable, although its historical affinity is equitable.'' It is suggested that the same is true of the statutory interpleader action.
12 In Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 404 at 412, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908), the Missouri court
held: "If the issues joined entitle the parties to an ordinary judgment at law, ••• the
parties are entitled to a trial by a jury; but if the issues tendered are equitable in their
nature and caIJ for equitable relief, then the cause is triable before the chancellor.'' :But see
McCaskill, "Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure," 88 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 315 (1940),
disapproving attempts to predicate jury rights upon the nature of the issues alone, since
often the same facts or issues could have appeared in either a law or an equity action,
with the character of the action determining jury rights. This being true does not, however, aid in characterizing a purely statutory action, nor does it supply a label for modern
proceedings which join actions for both "equitable" and "legal" relief arising out of the
same transaction.
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dence and a finding as to whether particular injuries did or did not cause
death are typically within the province of a jury, and a jury determination of this issue could have been granted in the principal case without
complicating the action.13 In fact, under the majority's holding, a jury
trial must still be had for the negligence and damage issues in an action at
law by the claimant prevailing in the present action. In view of the
constitutional mandate for preservation of jury trial and the interests of
efficient judicial administration, the better practice in this situation
would have been to settle all of the issues among the parties in the single
satutory action, with a jury passing on the cause of death as well as the
negligence and damage issues.
John A. Beach

lS When "legal" and "equitable" issues are joined, and there is a fact question common to both, a troublesome problem may be presented as to whether the jury must try
the legal issue first and thereby foreclose the judge's determination of the fact. The action
involved in the principal case presented no such difficulty, however.

